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FDA PREEMPTION AFTER THE FOOD AND DRUG AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007 
ABSTRACT 
  Opposing the explosive rise in tort litigation in the last two decades has 
been a corresponding rise in federal preemption claims. In the FDA context, the 
controversy  has  largely  surrounded  the  issue of  whether  federal  law  preempts 
state  common-law  “failure-to-warn”  claims  against  drug  and  medical-device 
manufacturers. During the current Bush Administration, FDA changed its position 
regarding preemption of state tort law claims and for the first time asserted that 
that compliance with FDA-mandated labeling provisions preempts common law 
failure-to-warn claims. The changed position attracted considerable attention in 
the academic and legal community, and the preemption debate has consequently 
become one of fiercest battles in products liability litigation today. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court is scheduled to hear a case next Term addressing preemption of 
products liability claims against drug manufacturers.  
Any  decision  addressing  preemption  of  drug-based  products  liability 
claims will have to consider the impact of the recent Food and Drug Amendments 
Administration  Amendments  Act  of  2007  (“FDAAA”).  This  Act  significantly 
expands FDA’s enforcement and surveillance powers, provides a framework for 
post-market risk identification, and expands the requirements for clinical trials 
registration  and  disclosure  of  results,  among  other  provisions.  This  Paper 
therefore examines the impact of the FDAAA on FDA’s preemption claims and 
concludes  that  by  strengthening  FDA’s  powers,  the  FDAAA  may  also  have 
strengthened FDA’s claim for preemption. By increasing the FDA’s ability to 
effectively  regulate  drug  efficacy  and  safety,  the  FDAAA  put  the  agency  on 
stronger ground when claiming ultimate authority over drug labeling. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
 
— U.S. CONSTITUTION article VI, clause 2  
 
  Ever since the founding of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), public health 
crises have played a prominent role in defining the scope of FDA’s drug regulation authority.
1 In 
its early days, FDA had little power to ensure that drugs on the market were safe and effective; 
modern day drug regulation was ushered in by the sulfanilamide
2 crisis of the 1930s. After over 
one hundred people died from consuming toxic Elixir Sulfanilamide,
3 Congress passed the Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
4 (“FDCA”). For the first time, FDA was given jurisdiction to 
ensure that drugs were safe before they were marketed. For over two decades, FDA’s power to 
regulate drugs remained largely unchanged until yet another drug tragedy rocked the country. In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of infants were born in Europe with terrible 
deformities after their mothers had taken the new sedative thalidomide. This tragedy focused 
                                                 
1 See KAREN F. GREIF & JOHN F. MERZ, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 
119 (2007) (arguing that a “pattern of regulation following seminal, even tragic, events and 
public outcries typifies the evolution of federal regulations of drugs and devices as well as the 
use of humans and animals in research”). 
2 See Paul M. Wax, Elixers, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 456, 456 (1995) (“The relationship between the 
government and the pharmaceutical manufacturers was profoundly changed by this event.”). 
3 Thirty-four children and seventy-one adults died after receiving Elixir Sulfanilamide. Wax, 
supra note 2, at 458. 
4 Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040.  
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public attention on pending legislation in Congress that would strengthen the FDCA.
5 In 1962, 
Congress passed a set of amendments to the FDCA, which gave FDA the power to ensure drugs 
were both safe and effective.
6 Among the many provisions of the Act, drug manufacturers were 
required to send adverse event reports to FDA, and drug advertising in medical journals was 
required to provide doctors with complete information about the risks and benefits of drugs.
7 
  After decades without such significant drug legislation, Vioxx may well prove to be the 
thalidomide of the new millennium. The pain-reliever Vioxx was widely marketed in the United 
States to treat acute pain, dysmenorrhea, and osteoarthritis.
8 However, the product was 
withdrawn by its manufacturer, Merck, in September 2004 after a new study found a higher rate 
of heart attacks and strokes in patients taking the drug than in those taking a placebo.
9 The 
withdrawal shocked the public in light of the fact that Vioxx had been marketed in more than 80 
countries, with worldwide sales totaling $2.5 billion in 2003, and had been sold in the United 
States for more than five years.
10 Post-withdrawal studies revealed that Vioxx may have caused 
an estimated 140,000 heart-related injuries and 56,000 deaths in the United States in the five 
                                                 
5 FDA Consumer, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels: Part III, 1962 Drug Amendments 
(June 1981), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/histor1b.html. 
6 Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Pub L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). Under these 
amendments drug sponsors were required to provide “substantial evidence” of safety and 
efficacy as part of the New Drug Application. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
7 FDA Consumer, supra note 5. 
8 FDA, Sequence of Events with Vioxx, Since Opening of IND, 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1_04_E-FDA-TAB-C.htm. 
9 Rita Rubin, How did the Vioxx debacle happen?, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm. 
10 Id.  
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years it was marketed.
11 The scandal was only compounded by reports that Vioxx’s 
manufacturer, Merck, had been alerted to the possible cardiovascular risks of Vioxx as early as 
2000, but had downplayed the drug’s risk and dismissed outside research confirming such 
risks.
12 Furthermore, although FDA was notified about the possible risks of Vioxx as early as 
2000, it took over fourteen months of intense negotiation between FDA and the manufacturer 
before new warning language to be added to the product label.
13 The fact that the drug’s serious 
risks had not been discovered until after marketing, combined with the considerable time it took 
for a warning to be added to the product label, led to a public sense that many of the Vioxx-
related injuries could have been prevented and that FDA had fallen short in its tasks of ensuring 
drug safety.
14 One author articulated the general outrage when he concluded that the information 
revealed in the unfolding Vioxx scandal “points to astonishing failures in Merck’s internal 
systems of post-marketing surveillance, as well as to lethal weaknesses in the US Food and Drug 
                                                 
11 Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx® and the Argument Against 
Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 67, 67 (2006). 
12   Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004 (“The data that first alerted Merck to the heart risks with Vioxx arrived in 
March 2000, derived from a study of 8,100 rheumatoid arthritis patients begun in January 1999. . 
. . Five times as many patients taking Vioxx had heart attacks as those taking [the pain reliever] 
naproxen.”), available at ttp://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/14merck.html?scp=1&sq 
=vioxx&st=cse; Rubin, supra note 9 (“Merck continued to minimize unfavorable findings up to 
a month before withdrawing Vioxx. On Aug. 26, the company fired off a press release refuting 
Graham's [unfavorable] study.”). 
13 FDALegislativeWatch, FDA Bill Passes; Congress Adds $225 Million to Industry User Fee 
Burden (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.fdalegislativewatch.com/2007/09/fda-bill-passes.html. 
14 For an excellent discussion of the regulatory failures surrounding Vioxx, see Margaret 
Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 941, 941 (2007).  
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Administration’s regulatory oversight.”
15 Advocacy groups pressed Congress to better equip 
FDA to monitor drug safety, in an effort to avoid similar tragedies in the future. Congress held a 
set of hearings
16 and issued several reports
17 outlining deficiencies in FDA regulation. FDA also 
requested study of its regulatory system from the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy 
of Sciences (“IOM”). In 2006, the IOM issued a landmark report, which found the FDA drug 
oversight system to be inadequate and recommended a lifecycle approach to obtaining 
information about a drug’s risks and benefits. To this end, the report suggested “increased 
enforcement authority and better enforcement tools directed at drug sponsors, which should 
include fines, injunctions, and withdrawal of drug approval.”
18 
  In response to the Vioxx tragedy
19 and the recommendations of the IOM,
20 in September 
2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Amendments Administration Amendments Act of 
                                                 
15 Richard Horton, Vioxx, the Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks at the FDA, 364 LANCET 
1995, 1995 (2004). 
16 E.g., The Adequacy of FDA to Assure the Safety of the Nation’s Drug Supply: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th 
Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110%5Fhouse%5Fhearings&docid=f:35502.pdf; FDA’s Drug Approval 
Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109%5Fsenate%5Fhearings&docid=f:99761.pdf. 
17 See e.g., COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM—MINORITY STAFF, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., PRESCRIPTION 
FOR HARM: THE DECLINE IN FDA ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY (2006), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060627101434-98349.pdf (concluding that there has 
been a decline in FDA enforcement since 2000, which, in some cases, has resulted in a health 
risk to consumers). 
18 INST. OF MED., NAT. ACAD. OF SCIENCES, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND 
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 168-70 (2006) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
19 See CONG. REC. H10596 (Sept 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. Pallone) (“The past several years 
have been marked by drug scandal after drug scandal. Vioxx, Ketek, Paxil and Avandia. These 
drugs have harmed families across the country and come to symbolize the urgent need for reform 
at the FDA.”); CONG. REC. H10598 (Sept 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“This  
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2007
21 (“FDAAA”). This Act is the most extensive revision of the FDCA since 1962; it 
significantly expands FDA’s enforcement and surveillance powers, provides a framework for 
post-market risk identification, and expands the requirements for clinical trials registration and 
disclosure of results, among other provisions.
22 Experts have described the Amendments as a 
“mammoth” bill, and it is likely to take courts, commentators, and FDA many years to sort 
through it.
23 This Paper will focus on only one small aspect of the 156 page-bill: its impact on 
federal preemption of drug labeling claims. 
  Preemption doctrine has been in existence for well over a hundred years,
24 but it has 
reached prominence in the drug and device context only in the last couple decades. Opposing the 
explosive rise in tort litigation in the last two decades has been a corresponding rise in federal 
preemption—a doctrine holding that state laws that conflict with federal law are preempted.
25 In 
the FDA context, the controversy has largely surrounded the issue of whether federal law 
preempts state common-law “failure-to-warn” claims against drug and medical-device 
                                                                                                                                                            
legislation will provide FDA with the ability to require companies to update their drug label with 
new safety information. Our goal here is the address tragic situations like Vioxx.”). 
20 For a comparison of the IOM recommendations and the final FDCAA provisions, see Bruce 
M. Psaty & David Korn, Congress Responds to the IOM Drug Safety Report—In Full, 298 
JAMA 2185 (2007). 
21 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (to be codified as amended at 21 USC §§301 et seq.) 
[hereinafter FDAAA]. The bill passed the House by a vote of 405 to 7 on September 19, 2007, 
and the Senate by unanimous consent the following day.  
22 The relevant provisions of the FDAAA will be explored in more detail infra Part III. 
23 See Gardiner Harris, House Passes Bill Giving More Power to the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/20/washington/20fda.html (referring to 
the House version of the bill). 
24 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
25 Preemption doctrine is discussed in more detail in Part II.A, infra.  
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manufacturers.
26 During the current Bush Administration, FDA changed its position regarding 
preemption of state tort law claims and for the first time asserted that that compliance with FDA-
mandated labeling provisions preempts common law failure-to-warn claims.  
  The preemption issue has garnered much attention lately in the academic and legal 
community and has been characterized as “the fiercest battle in products liability litigation 
today.”
27 Indeed, the Supreme Court has already decided two cases this term relating to 
preemption.
28 In Warner-Lambert v. Kent,
29 the Court reached a 4-4 deadlock (Chief Justice 
recused himself) on whether federal law preempted a Michigan law immunizing pharmaceutical 
companies from products liability claims except in cases of “fraud-on-the FDA.”
30 With respect 
to medical devices, however, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 last February that some suits against 
device manufacturers are preempted.
31 Arguably, this decision is the most recent in a line of 
                                                 
26 The debates over preemption of state products liability claims against manufacturers of drugs 
and medical devices are closely related. However, the arguments are also distinguishable because 
the Medical Device Act explicitly preempts state tort actions. [[Cite]] Thus, this Paper will 
largely ignore preemption of medical device claims. However, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Medtronic will be analyzed in Part x, infra, to the extent that its analysis sheds light 
on preemption claims against drug manufacturers. 
27 Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (.2008). 
28 As a general matter, there has been a sharp increase in the number of preemption cases decided 
by the Supreme Court in the last two decades as compared to prior decades. JAMES T. O’REILLY, 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 2 (2006). 
29 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam). 
30 The Court issued only a one-line opinion: “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided 
Court.” Id. at 1168. 
31 See Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). Note, however, that the preemption analysis 
for medical devices is distinguishable from that of prescription drugs because there is an express 
preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments on 1976, which preempts state 
requirements that are “different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable . . . to the 
device” under the Medical Device Amendments. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).   
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cases embodying “a pro-defense trend” among the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions,
32 and 
some commentators have speculated that the Court would be inclined to rule similarly on the 
issue of drug-related tort claims.
33 The issue may be decided soon, as the Supreme Court will 
hear a case next Term addressing preemption of products liability claims against drug 
manufacturers.
34   
  The recent focus on this issue is hardly surprising. Preemption is extremely important for 
both plaintiffs and defendants. As one legal blog succinctly summarized, preemption matters for 
four reasons: it is potent, generic, legal, and severable.
35 A finding of preemption is potent in that 
it eliminates all of the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims based on alleged inadequacies in the 
drug's package insert, including strict liability, negligence, warranty, and consumer protection act 
claims.
36 Because of the difficulty of proving manufacturing defect or design defect claims for 
drugs, such failure-to-warn claims are often the primary basis for a plaintiff’s tort suit.
37 
Preemption is also generic—it extends beyond an individual plaintiff to preclude failure-to-warn 
                                                 
32 See Sharkey, supra note 27, at 455. 
33 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris & Alex Berenson, Drug Makers Near Old Goal: A Legal Shield, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/washington/ 
06patch.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&oref=slogin (“After decades of being dismissed 
by courts, [preemption] now appears to be on the verge of success, lawyers for plaintiffs and 
drug companies say.”).  
34 Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (Jan 18, 2008) (No. 
06-1249); see also infra notes 174-182 (discussing the Wyeth case in more detail).  
35 Drug and Device Law, Why Does Preemption Matter? (Apr. 15, 2007), 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/04/why-does-preemption-matter.html. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. (“In most pharma products cases, failure-to-warn is the whole ball game.”)  
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claims by any plaintiff based on a particular drug.
38 In some cases, a preemption holding can 
even extend beyond a particular drug to preempt claims against a whole class of products, such 
as antibiotics,
39 or even all drugs or medical devices.
40  Furthermore, defendants favor 
preemption because is a purely legal question and may be decided on a motion to dismiss or on 
summary judgment, before the parties have incurred the enormous costs of discovery.
41 
Likewise, the factual issues underlying preemption are severable from the other issues in a case, 
again reducing the costs of litigation.
42 Therefore, the preemption issue is of paramount 
importance for litigants. With settlement sums and jury verdicts in product liability suits 
sometimes running in the millions or billions of dollars,
43 manufacturers are advocating 
                                                 
38 See id. 
39 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 516 A.2d 288 (1983) (holding that the labeling 
requirements for antibiotic drugs preempted a state failure to warn claim). 
40 In Medtronic, for example, the Supreme Court held that common law claims of “strict liability; 
breach of implied warranty; and negligence in the design, testing, inspection, distribution, 
labeling, marketing, and sale” were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. 
Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005-06 (208). Likewise, the question in Wyeth v. Levine 
relates to whether the prescription drug labeling provisions of the FDCA broadly preempt “state 
law product liability claims.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 
(Mar. 12, 2007). 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See James Copland, Leave It to the FDA, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2008, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/14/AR2008031402875.html 
(“Merck spent upwards of $1 billion defending against Vioxx claims before recently reaching a 
partial settlement agreement for more than $5 billion, while the estimated tab for Wyeth over its 
recalled diet drug combination Fen-Phen is $21 billion.”).  
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vigorously for preemption,
44 while plaintiffs and their lawyers
45 as advocating just as vigorously 
in the opposite direction.   
Any decision addressing preemption of drug-based products liability claims will find it 
hard not to consider those claims in light of “the most comprehensive reform of prescription drug 
regulation in four decades”
46 — the FDAAA. The issue of preemption was very much on the 
mind of legislatures when the bill was passed. Congress considered various preemption-related 
provisions in successive versions of the bill, eventually settling on an obtuse “rule of 
construction” stating that the new FDA enforcement powers contained in the FDAAA shall not 
be construed to affect the responsibilities of a drug manufacturer to maintain its label in 
accordance with existing requirements.
47 Lawyers in the field have already begun speculating 
that plaintiffs will attempt to use the rule to undermine arguments for FDA preemption.
48 
                                                 
44 Immunity from products liability would also dramatically reduce a manufacturer’s liability 
exposure and insurance costs. James T. O’Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug 
Administration Approval of a Prescription Drug Label Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate 
Warning?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 289 (2003). 
45 See O’REILLY, supra note 34, at 3 (“Preemption has become a ‘dollars-and-cents’ issue for 
every lawyer whose livelihood depends on contingent fee portions of large jury verdicts awarded 
to injured persons.”). 
46 Covance, FDAAA Overview, http://www.covance.com/fdaaa/ (last visited May 10, 2008). 
47 See Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat 823, 925-26 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(I)). The 
rule of construction will be analyzed in greater detail in Part IV.A, infra. 
48 See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, THE FDA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007, at 9 (2007) (arguing that 
the rule of construction is “undoubtedly a tool that will be used by plaintiffs seeking to 
undermine preemption in ‘failure to warn’ cases), available at http://arnoldporter.com/resources/ 
documents/A&PCA_ExecutiveSummary-TheFDA_Oct107_V2.pdf; Drug and Device Law, The 
2007 FDCA Amendments and Preemption (Oct. 18, 2007) (“[T]he ink’s hardly dry on the 
FDAAA before the plaintiffs are at it again, claiming that an obscure ‘rule of construction,’ 
facially applicable only to a single section of the new act, somehow undermines preemption as to 
the FDCA as a whole.”); see also Susan J. Pannell, Claim Based on Deceptive Drug Ads is 
Preempted, Third Circuit Holds, 43 TRIAL 16, 18 (quoting American Association for Justice 
regulatory counsel, Gerie Voss, as stating: “With the recent passage of the Food and Drug  
  11 
However, the meaning of the rule is subject to considerable controversy and has yet to be 
resolved by the courts. In contrast, by strengthening the FDA’s powers, the FDAAA may 
actually have strengthened FDA’s claim for preemption. By increasing the FDA’s ability to 
effectively regulate drug efficacy and safety, FDA is on stronger ground when asserting that 
“[t]he ultimate authority over drug, biologic, and medical device labeling, therefore, continues to 
rest with FDA.”
49 
This Paper makes an initial attempt to analyze the complex text and history of the 
FDAAA and evaluate the impact of the Act on drug-related preemption claims. Because 
preemption is heavily dependent on the federal regulatory scheme in place, Part II begins by 
providing background on the scope of drug regulation under the FDCA. Against this 
background, Part III summarizes the current preemption theories being advanced by litigants: 
Part III.A lays out the basics of preemption doctrine, in particular implied conflict preemption, 
which is the category of preemption most commonly at issue in drug-related products liability 
claims. Part III.B next discusses FDA’s historical preemption position — one that eschewed 
agency preemption in favor of a more complementary relationship between state and federal 
regulations to ensure adequate regulation of drug safety. Part III.C then introduces FDA’s more 
recent preemption position, which asserts that federal regulations constitute both a ceiling and a 
floor on drug labeling requirements, therefore preempting common law failure-to-warn claims. 
Due to the considerable opposition that has surrounded FDA’s recently articulated pro-
preemption view, Part IV then analyzes the strength of FDA’s position in light of the new 
                                                                                                                                                            
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Congress has stated its intent that FDA regulation 
should not preempt the field and that drug companies continue to have an independent obligation 
to promptly update a label to warn consumers of a drug’s risks”). 
49 FDA, Proposed Rule, Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2849 (proposed Jan. 11, 2008).  
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surveillance and enforcement powers contained in the FDAAA. Part IV argues that though the 
text of the statute and the legislative history are not determinative on the issue of preemption, 
courts are likely to adopt the agency’s pro-preemption interpretation of the FDCA in light of the 
fact that the agency is now better able to monitor drug safety. Lastly, Part V concludes. 
 
II.  FDA REGULATION OF DRUGS UNDER THE FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT 
 
  Drugs are subject to pervasive regulation under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and 
are one of the most heavily regulated consumer products in the nation.
50 New drugs must obtain 
premarket approval from FDA, which requires a showing that the drug is safe and effective for 
its intended use. Manufacturers must submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to receive 
premarket approval, and such an application must contain evidence of “adequate tests . . . to 
show whether or not [the] drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling.”
51 The proposed labeling itself is also subject to detailed 
requirements under the FDCA.
52 These requirements are significant to the preemption debate, 
especially those relating to warnings for prescription drugs. This Part begins by summarizing the 
basic drug labeling requirements under the FDCA. Next, this Part discusses FDA’s expanded 
authority under the FDAAA to ensure that drugs are safe and correctly labeled. 
 
                                                 
50 See Daniel E. Troy, The Case for Federal Premption, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 81, 82 
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds. 2007). 
51 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
52 The labeling requirements for prescription and over-the-counter drugs differ. This Paper will 
only address the labeling requirements for prescription drugs.  
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a.  Drug Labeling Requirements Under the FDCA 
 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2), a drug is misbranded unless, among other things, its 
labeling bears: “(1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against use in 
those pathological conditions or by children where its use may be dangerous to health, or against 
unsafe dosage or methods or duration of administration or application, in such manner and form, 
as are necessary for the protection of users . . . .”
53 An applicant submitting an NDA must 
include a proposed physician package insert to be included with the product. This insert is 
intended to ensure that physicians are informed of the risks and benefits of a drug. In particular, 
the warning section of the insert must describe clinically significant adverse reactions or other 
potential safety hazards, limitations in use imposed by them, and steps that should be taken if 
they occur.
54 The initial warnings supplied with a new prescription drug when it is first marketed 
are specifically prescribed by FDA.
55 Approval of an NDA is conditioned upon the applicant 
incorporating the specified labeling changes exactly as directed and submitting a copy of the 
final printed labeling to FDA prior to marketing.
56 
  However, information relating to drug safety that is discovered after a drug has been 
marketed may obligate the manufacturer to provide additional warnings or prompt FDA to 
require changes in the approved labeling.
57 The regulations mandate that “[i]n accordance with 
                                                 
53 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2). 
54 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(1). The warning requirements are extremely detailed. For more on 
the required contents of the warning section, see id. § 201.57(c)(6). 
55 Peter BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW 422 (2d ed. 1991). 
56 21 C.F.R. 314.105(b). 
57 HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 55, at 422-23.  
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314.70 and 601.12 of this chapter, the labeling must be revised to include a warning about a 
clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a 
drug; a causal relationship need not be established.”
58 In general, however, these warnings 
cannot be added unilaterally by the manufacturer. Under 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, manufacturers must 
submit a supplemental application to FDA and obtain the agency’s advance approval for labeling 
changes.
59 If a manufacturer makes a labeling change prior to receiving approval, FDA may 
reject the change and order the manufacturer to cease distribution of the product.
60  
There is a significant exception, however, to the prior approval requirement for labeling 
changes: manufacturers have authority the Changes Being Effected (“CBEs”) provisions to “add 
or strengthen a contradiction, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction” without first obtaining 
FDA approval, simply by providing notice to the agency.
61 Likewise, the manufacturer does not 
need prior approval to add or strengthen statements about drug abuse, dependence, psychological 
effect, or overdosage, or to add or strengthen instructions about dosage and administration 
intended to increase safe use of the drug.
62 
  Despite these detailed requirements, the Vioxx tragedy and other drug safety scandals 
exposed the agency to criticism that its regulatory system failed in practice.
63 Critics argued that 
                                                 
58 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i). 
59 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (“The applicant must obtain approval of a supplement from FDA prior 
to distribution of a drug product made using a change under paragraph (b) of this section.”). 
60 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(7). 
61 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A). 
62 Id. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(B)-(C). 
63 See, e.g., Horton, supra note 15, at 1995 (“In the case of Vioxx, FDA was urged to mandate 
further clinical safety testing . . . . It did not do so. This refusal to engage with an issue of grave  
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FDA had too little authority to monitor drugs once they have been approved, and too few 
enforcement mechanisms once risks were actually detected.
64 The IOM Report, for example, 
concluded that “FDA lacks the clear, unambiguous authority needed to enforce sponsor 
compliance with regulatory requirements and instead relies on the prospect of productive 
negotiations with industry. .  . . FDA’s authorities must be clarified and strengthened to empower 
the agency to take rapid and decisive actions when necessary and appropriate.”
65 Therefore, with 
the passage of the FDAAA, Congress gave FDA significant new authority to ensure to that drugs 
were safe and properly labeled. 
 
b.  The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
 
The FDAAA is an expansive piece of legislation spanning well over a hundred pages. 
Parts of the legislation consist of reauthorizing existing law — such as FDA’s prescription drug 
user fee program and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act  — but the Act also bestows 
important new powers upon the FDA. It would be impossible to adequately discuss all of the 
new provisions in a paper this short; therefore, I will focus only on the provisions that are most 
                                                                                                                                                            
clinical concern illustrates the agency’s in-built paralysis, a predicament that has to be addressed 
through fundamental organizational reform.”). 
64 See, e.g., Maurice Hinchey, The Fight to Safeguard American Drug Safety in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 685 (2006) (“Unlike its abilities on the drug approval front, the 
FDA’s options on the drug safety front are reduced to pleading for small changes . . . and is only 
able to enforce on major change: declaring a drug misbranded and yanking it from the market — 
an action that is rarely used.”). 
65 IOM REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11.  
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relevant to the preemption debate.
66 The significant changes fall into three general categories: an 
active surveillance system, tools to detect drug risks, and greater authority to require warning and 
labeling.
67 The law also provides strengthened enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Active Post-Market Surveillance System — The least well-defined of FDA’s new duties 
and authorities is the post-market risk identification and analysis requirement. This provision 
was imposed due to the recommendations of the IOM report, which emphasized the importance 
of post-market surveillance for detecting risks not found during clinical trials.
68 FDAAA requires 
FDA to establish an active postmarket risk identification and analysis system within two years of 
enactment.
69 This system would provide access to federal and private medical records data and 
link and analyze data to provide, among other things, for active adverse event surveillance and 
reporting, identification of trends and patterns in the data, and the ability to export data for 
further aggregation, analysis and reporting.
70 The goal of this provision is to include at least 25 
million patients by July 2010 and 100 million patients by July 2012.
71 Within one year after 
developing methods to link and analyze these data, the Secretary must establish and actually 
                                                 
66 For a more comprehensive discussion of the FDAAA provisions, see COVINGTON & BURLING 
LLP, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007 (2007), available at 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/2d3ce0d0-ec9e-4d8b-a376-3d79293d830f/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/a514e76e-029b-4f0e-b9e1-06e3ef3dc7ef/Food%20and%20Drug%20 
Administration%20Amendments%20Act%20of%202007.pdf 
67 See CONG. REC. S11835 (Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
68 See Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, 
Preemption, and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 361, 363 (2008) 
69 FDCA § 505(k)(3)(B). 
70 Id. § 505(k)(3)(B)(i), (C)(i). 
71 Id. § 505(k)(3)(B)(ii).  
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maintain procedures for the post-market risk identification and analysis system.
72 Since this 
system is still in its nascent stages, however, it is difficult to measure the practical success of this 
system in detecting post-market drug risks.
73 
 
Increased Risk-Detection Tools  — The FDAAA increases FDA’s ability to detect safety 
risks. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services
74 to require the drug’s 
“responsible person” (defined as the holder of the approved or pending NDA)
75 to conduct post-
market studies or clinical trials under certain circumstances. If the Secretary determines that the 
responsible person’s current reporting and post-market risk identification systems
76 are not 
sufficient to address a drug safety concern, the Secretary may require post-approval studies to 
assess a known serious risk or signals of a serious risk related to the use of the drug, or to 
identify an unexpected serious risk when available data indicates the potential for such risk.
77 If 
the Secretary makes a determination that a post-approval studies will not be sufficient to meet 
the purposes above, he or she may require the responsible person to conduct a clinical trial.
78 
                                                 
72 Id. § 505(k)(3)(C). 
73 See Gilhooley, supra note 68, at 364 (“[T]he agency would seem to need more experience with 
the system before an adequate assessment can be made of the potential for success.”). 
74 Determinations by the Secretary under FDCA § 505(o) must “be made by individuals at or 
above the level of individuals empowered to approve a drug (such as division directors within 
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research).” FDCA § 505(o)(5). 
75 Id. § 505(o)(2)(A). 
76 The post-market risk-identification requirements are contained at FDCA §505(k).  
77 Id. § 505(o)(3)(D)(i). 
78 Id. § 505(o)(3)(D)(ii).  
  18 
However, if the product in question is already approved, the Secretary may not require a post-
approval study or clinical trial unless he or she becomes aware of new safety information.
79  
The Act also requires sponsors to submit a proposed “risk evaluation and mitigation 
strategy” (“REMS”) as part of an NDA or abbreviated NDA when the Secretary determines that 
a REMS is necessary to ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks.
80 Even if a REMS 
is not required when an application is approved, the Secretary may later require submission of a 
REMS proposal if he or she becomes aware of new safety information
81 and makes a 
determination that a REMS is necessary to ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh its 
risks.
82 The holder of the approved application must then submit a proposed REMS within 120 
days of notification, or within such other reasonable time as the Secretary requires to protect the 
public health.
83 If the Secretary makes the necessary finding, the proposed REMS may be 
required to include a medication guide, a patient package insert, or a plan for communication to 
healthcare providers.
84 The Secretary may also require that the REMS include “such elements as 
                                                 
79 Id. § 505(o)(3)(C). Under  § 505(o)(2)(C) “new safety information” is giving its meaning 
under FDCA § 505-1(b)(3) — information about a serious risk or an unexpected serious risk 
associated with use of the drug, or information about the effectiveness of the approved risk 
evaluation mitigation strategy of the drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(3). 
80 FDCA § 505-1(a)(1). 
81 “New safety information” is defined as information derived from a clinical trial, an adverse 
event report, a post-approval study, peer-reviewed literature, the postmarket risk identification 
and analysis system, or other appropriate scientific data about: (1) a serious risk associated with 
use of the drug that the Secretary has become aware of since the drug was approved, since the 
REMS was required, or since the last assessment of the approved REMS; or (2) the effectiveness 
of the approved REMS since the last assessment of such strategy. FDCA § 505-1(b)(3). 
82 Id. § 505-1(a)(2)(A). 
83 Id. § 505-1(a)(2)(B). 
84 Id. § 505-1(e).  
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are necessary to assure safe use of the drug,” if it is associated with a serious adverse drug 
experience and could be approved only if, or would be withdrawn unless, the elements are made 
part of the REMS.
85 Required elements may include that: (1) prescribers have particular training, 
experience, or certification; (2) drug dispensers are certified; (3) the drug be dispensed to 
patients only in certain settings; (4) that patients have evidence of “safe-use conditions; (5) 
patients be monitored; and (6) patients be enrolled in registries.
86 The drug holder must also 
conduct periodic assessments of the REMS, among other detailed requirements.
87 A drug may be 
deemed misbranded if the responsible person does not comply with a REMS requirement and the 
person may be subject to civil monetary penalties.
88
 
 
Authority to Require Warnings and Labeling — Finally, the FDCAA provides FDA with 
greater authority to require drug warnings and labeling. The Act does not alter the basic labeling 
scheme under the FDCA or the policy behind it.
89 However, the Act introduces provisions for 
imposing new labeling requirements when FDA becomes aware of new drug safety information. 
These changes are a response to the perceived inability of FDA to effectively impose labeling 
requirements—as illustrated by the fourteenth-month negotiation process between FDA and 
                                                 
85 Id. § 505-1(f)(1). 
86 Id. § 505-1(f)(3). 
87 Id. § 505-1(g).  
88 Id. § 502(y), 303(f)(4). 
89 CONG. REC. S11835 (Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The provision does not affect 
the agency’s general policy on labeling or its current labeling rules and policy.”).  
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Merck to add relevant warnings to the Vioxx label.
90 The Act first imposes a mandatory duty on 
the FDA to act in the face of new safety information: “If the Secretary becomes aware of new 
safety information that the Secretary believes should be included in the labeling of the drug, the 
Secretary shall promptly notify the responsible person.”
91 The Act then delineates a strict 
timetable for the process. Within 30 days of such notification, the responsible person must either 
(1) submit a supplement proposing labeling changes or (2) notify the Secretary that he or she 
does not believe labeling changes are warranted and submit a statement detailing why.
92 If the 
Secretary disagrees with the proposed changes or the notification that labeling changes are not 
warranted, the Secretary must initiate discussions with the responsible party to reach an 
agreement on whether the labeling for the drug should be modified, and if so, what the contents 
of such labeling changes should be.
93 Significantly, such negotiation may not extend beyond 
thirty days unless the Secretary determines that an extension is warranted.
94 Within fifteen days 
of the conclusion of these discussions, the Secretary may issue an order direction the responsible 
person to make a labeling change, and the responsible person must submit a supplement with the 
labeling change within the next fifteen days.
95 Finally, the responsible person may appeal within 
                                                 
90 FDALegislativeWatch, FDA Bill Passes; Congress Adds $225 Million to Industry User Fee 
Burden (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.fdalegislativewatch.com/2007/09/fda-bill-passes.html (“In 
response to complaints that patients continued to be exposed to Vioxx while FDA and Merck 
spent 18 months negotiating new warning language in the label, H.R. 3580 not only gives FDA 
authority to require label changes, but sets timelines for negotiations.”). 
91 FDCA § 505(o)(4)(A). 
92 Id. § 505(o)(4)(B). 
93 Id. § 505(o)(4)(C). 
94 Id. § 505(o)(4)(D). 
95 Id. § 505(o)(4)(E).  
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five days of receiving the order.
96 The above timetable may be accelerated if the labeling change 
is needed to protect public health.
97 In addition, the FDAAA requires dispute resolution 
procedures for labeling changes, but those these procedures are not specified in the law and must 
be implemented through agency “regulation and guidance.”
98 The new labeling provisions also 
strengthen the agency’s enforcement authority. FDA may order civil monetary penalties if a 
sponsor fails to comply with an order pursuant to a dispute resolution proceeding that orders 
post-approval testing or a safety labeling change.
99  
Notably, the new labeling requirements raised concerns among trial lawyers and some 
members of Congress, who worried that the scheme would allow drug firms to argue that any 
state-based liability claims are pre-empted by FDA's labeling powers.
100 As a result, the bill now 
contains language stating that sponsors are still responsible for maintaining their labels in 
compliance with the governing regulations. This language, called a “rule of construction,” states: 
 
This paragraph shall not be construed to affect the responsibilities or the 
responsible person or the holder of the approved application under section 505 (j) 
to maintain its label in accordance with existing requirements, including Subpart 
B or Part 201 and Section 314.70 and 601.12 of Title 21, Code of Federal 
Regulations (or any successor regulations).
101 
 
                                                 
96 Id. § 505(o)(4)(F). 
97 Id. § 505(o)(4)(H). 
98 Id. § 505(o)(4)(F). 
99 Id. §303(f)(4). 
100 FDALegislativeWatch, FDA Bill Passes; Congress Adds $225 Million to Industry User Fee 
Burden (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.fdalegislativewatch.com/2007/09/fda-bill-passes.html. 
101 FDCA § 505(o)(4)(I).  
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Commentators immediately warned that the rule of construction is “product of lobbying 
by the plaintiffs’ bar” and is “undoubtedly a tool that will be used by plaintiffs seeking to 
undermine preemption in ‘failure to warn’ cases.”
102 Already it appears such predications were 
correct. For example, in the briefings for Wyeth v. Levine, which will be heard by the Supreme 
Court later this Term, the respondent argues that “the rule of construction underscores 
Congress’s view that, in the future, state-law damages liability should continue to coexist with 
the FDA’s enhanced power to demand label changes.”
103 However, the text of the provision does 
not unequivocally indicate that it was meant to have an anti-preemption impact.
104 The issue is 
complex, and the impact of the rule of construction likely will depend significantly on its 
interpretation by the courts.
105 Nevertheless, an initial analysis of the implications of the rule of 
construction for the preemption debate is explored in further detail in Part IV. But first, I will 
provide some necessary background on the preemption conflict. 
 
III.  THE HISTORY OF THE PREEMPTION DEBATE 
  FDA’s position on preemption of drug claims has changed in the last decade, attracting 
considerable attention from scholars and litigants. Its early position was characterized by a 
generally anti-preemption position, in which state and federal law were complementary, and state 
law was seen as a necessary supplement to ensure drug safety. During the current Bush 
                                                 
102 ARNOLD & PORTER, supra note 48, at 9. 
103 Respondent’s Supplemental Brief in Response to Brief of the United States at 9, Wyeth v. 
Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2008), 2008 WL 55106.  
104 See infra Part IV.A. 
105 C.f. Respondent’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 103, at 9 (predicting that the meaning of 
the rule of construction “will be fiercely debated in case after case”).  
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Administration, however, the agency reversed its position and began to assert in amicus briefs 
and rulemakings that the federal drug regulation scheme contained in the FDCA preempted 
common law product liability claims. Some commentators have blasted the new policy and 
attributed the change in position purely to a change in politics — claiming the current view is a 
result of pro-industry allegiances of the new administration.
106 For example, in 2004, 
Congressman Maurice Hinchey accused then-FDA Chief Counsel Daniel Troy of taking the 
agency “in a radical new direction,” and “wast[ing] taxpayer money on pursuits that are 
undermining FDA's basic mission.”
107 He then went on to accuse the FDA of a “pattern of 
collusion” with drug companies and medical device manufacturers.
108 Other commentators, 
however, have defended the new policy as well supported by precedent,
109 and have asserted that 
it is necessary in light of the danger posed by an explosion in products liability litigation.
110 This 
Part discusses the conflicting views on FDA preemption of product liability claims against drug 
manufacturers. But first, in order to help the reader understand the FDA’s varying positions on 
                                                 
106 See, e.g., MARGARET H. CLUNE, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, STEALTH TORT 
REFORM: HOW THE BUS ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE USE OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
HURTS CONSUMERS (2004) (“[I]t appears that the primary motivating concept behind FDA’s pro-
preemption briefs is the Bush Administration’s tort reform agenda.”). 
107 150 CONG. REC. H5598 (July 13, 2004) (statement of Rep. Hinchey). 
108 Id. at H5599. 
109 See, e.g., Letter from Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill, Richard M. Cooper, Nancy L. 
Buc and Thomas Scarlett to Hon. Henry Bonilla (July 15, 2004), 150 Cong. Rec. E1505-30 (July 
22, 2004). The authors of this letter, five former FDA Chief Counsels, cited previous cases in 
which the FDA had submitted amicus briefs and argued that “there is ample precedent for the 
actions that Mr. Troy has recently been undertaking. His action is not radical or even novel.” Id. 
at E1506. 
110 See, e.g., id at E1506 (“There is a greater need for FDA intervention today because plaintiffs 
in courts are intruding more heavily on FDA's primary jurisdiction than ever before.”); Troy, 
supra note 50, at 85-91 (identifying four risks of increased tort litigation: decreased investment 
in research, decreased availability of investigational or approved drugs, increased drug prices, 
and interference with rational prescribing).   
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the preemption conflict, this Part begins with a brief summary of the relevant preemption 
doctrine. 
a.  Background on Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 
 
Under the Supremacy Clause of article VI, federal law is the supreme law of the land.
111 
This clause has long been interpreted to mean that state or local action that conflicts with 
congressional action is preempted and no longer has the force of law.
112 Likewise, it has long 
been accepted that regulations promulgated by a federal agency such as FDA, pursuant to a 
congressional delegation, have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes.
113 But while the 
concept of preemption is uncontroversial, determining whether a state law conflicts with federal 
law proves to be a difficult matter in practice. This task is not made any easier by the fact that the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its application of preemption doctrine.
114 However, the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that Congressional intent to preempt is paramount to the 
                                                 
111 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
112 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (recognizing that in the case of 
“such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the 
execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, 
made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United 
States . . . the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted 
in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”); Fidelity Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (“[S]tate law is nullified to the extent 
that it actually conflicts with federal law.”). 
113 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 481 (2d ed. 1988) (citing 
Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., 481 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“We have held 
repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal 
statutes.”)). 
114 See Sharkey, supra note 27, at 454 (“It is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any 
consistent principle or explanatory variable emerges from the Supreme Court's products liability 
preemption jurisprudence.”).  
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inquiry.
115 A rule may only preempt to the extent intended by Congress.
116 In its case law, the 
Court has created three categories of cases in which Congress’s intention is sufficiently clear to 
preempt state law: express preemption, field preemption, and implied conflict preemption. In 
general, preemption of drug-related products liability claims falls under the conflict preemption 
category. To show why this is so, I will discuss each type of preemption in turn. 
 
Express Preemption — Express preemption is preemption that exists as a matter of statute 
or as a matter of agency regulation. To fit within this category, the statute or regulation must 
contain a provision specifically referring to preemption and explaining which state laws are 
supplanted.
117 For example, the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 contain a provision stating 
that “no State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human 
use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable 
under this Act to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or 
to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this Act.”
118 
However, Congress has never passed statutory language addressing preemption with respect to 
                                                 
115 See Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (“The purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone.”). 
116 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION § 8167 (2008). 
117 STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 275 (5th ed. 2005). 
118 Pub.L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k). The Supreme Court 
ruled last February that this provision preempted some suits against medical device 
manufacturers. See Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).  
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the regulation of prescription drugs;
119 thus, state-law tort claims against drug manufacturers are 
not expressly preempted.
120 
 
Field Preemption — In the second category of preemption, field preemption, 
Congressional intent is inferred from the comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme. 
Preemption occurs when the federal scheme created by Congress is so pervasive that it is 
understood as manifesting an attempt by Congress to control the field.
121 Professor Tribe has 
described this category as one “within which states are deemed powerless to act because of a 
vacuum deliberately, even if not expressly, created by federal legislation.”
122 After the passage of 
the FDAAA, some consumer advocacy groups worried that the expansive provisions in the Act 
would create a pervasive regulatory scheme adequate to create field preemption.
123  
However, fears of field preemption in the drug context are likely unfounded for several 
reasons. First, the consequences of finding field preemption are significant: field preemption 
generally occurs where there is no federal law with which the state law conflicts (otherwise 
                                                 
119 In contrast, Congress has include express preemption provisions for the labeling of 
nonprescription drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 379r, and medical devices, id. § 360k. 
120 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784 (E.D. La. 2007) 
(“[T]he FDCA does not contain an express statement that Congress intended to displace state-
law claims in the prescription drug context.”). 
121 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“The scheme of federal 
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it.”). 
122 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 479 (2d ed. 1988). 
123 See, e.g., People Over Profits, Information on the Rule of Construction Regarding Federal 
Preemption, http://www.peopleoverprofits.org/site/c.ntJWJ8MPIqE/b.2804449/k.BC2F/ 
Federal_Preemption.htm (last visited April 15, 2008) (“The drug safety provisions in the PDUFA 
reauthorization create field preemption.”).  
  27 
conflict preemption would occur), so a finding of field preemption means that the matter is left 
unregulated by either the state or the federal government.
124 Therefore, courts employ a strong 
presumption against field preemption, and proponents of preemption must show that Congress 
has expressed an intent that federal law be exclusive in the field. This is especially true in areas, 
such as tort law, that have traditionally been regulated by the states.
125 Second, state law still 
operates to control a number of prescription drug issues: states license drug manufacturers, 
determine prescription status, penalize pharmacists for mishandling prescription drugs, and 
oversee controlled substances.
126 Third, a specific preemption provision added as part of the 
Drug Amendments of 1962 specifies that the 1962 amendments, which include the basic labeling 
requirements, may not preempt state law unless there is direct and positive conflict between such 
amendments and the state law.
127 Therefore, though some scholars have advocated for field 
preemption as a policy matter,
 128  in general, drug manufacturers have not pursued field 
preemption claims.
129  
                                                 
124 STONE, supra note 117, at 276; c.f. Sharkey, supra note 27, at 480 (“The Supreme Court has 
set a high bar to imputing a congressional intent to preempt when such an interpretation would 
create what I would call a remedial or enforcement ‘void.’”). 
125 See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (“Congress legislated here in field which the States have 
traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.” (internal citations omitted)). 
126 O’Reilly, supra note 44, at 291. 
127 Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Pub L. No. 87-781 § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962). 
128 For arguments in favor of field preemption in the drug context see, for example, David R. 
Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied 
Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety 
Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 397 (1996). 
129 See, e.g., Astrazeneca’s Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Briefing Regarding 
AstraZeneca’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the Basis of Federal Preemption at 4, In  
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Conflict Preemption — The final category of preemption is conflict preemption. This is 
the type of preemption most likely to implicate claims against tort manufacturers. Like field 
preemption, this category of preemption is implied — there is no express preemption provision 
and Congress’s intent to preempt state law is implicit. Implied preemption can be described as 
falling into two subcategories: actual preemption and obstacle preemption.
130 Actual preemption 
occurs when compliance with both the federal and state law is impossible.
131 Object preemption 
occurs when it would be technically possible to comply with both state and federal law, but 
compliance with state law would frustrate the federal purpose.
132 The distinction between these 
two types of conflict preemption may be more semantic than practical, however, as the Court has 
                                                                                                                                                            
re Seroquel Products Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1769 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2007) (“[Astrazeneca’s] 
motion is based on the doctrine of implied conflict preemption (not field preemption) arising 
from the authoritative federal actions of the FDA acting within the scope of its congressionally 
delegated authority.”). 
130 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (Mar. 12, 2007) 
(“This Court has consistently made clear that conflict preemption analysis requires consideration 
both of whether it would be impossible to comply with federal and state law and of whether the 
state law would stand as an obstacle to the objectives of federal law.”). These subcategories of 
preemption may be referred to by varying names. The Supreme Court, for example, has 
sometimes called the “obstacle” type of conflict preemption “frustration of purpose” preemption. 
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 885 (2000). 
131 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (conflict 
preemption occurs where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility”). 
132 See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913) (“[T]o the extent that state law 
interferes with or frustrates the operation of the acts of Congress, its provisions must yield to the 
superior Federal power . .  . .”).  
  29 
previously conceptualized obstacle preemption as a form of actual preemption, where the 
conflict is simply more subtle.
133  
On the other hand, the presumption that the Court chooses to employ when deciding an 
implied preemption case may have considerable practical significance. While the presumption 
against preemption is generally accepted in the field preemption context, the presumption in 
conflict preemption cases is less well-settled. Some courts and commentators have indicated that 
there is a presumption against preemption even in actual conflict cases, and that the presumption 
is particularly strong in cases involving areas of that that are traditionally occupied by the 
states.
134 Other commentators interpret the case law to establish that the presumption against 
preemption originated in field preemption cases should be limited to such cases.
135 The one thing 
that can be said for certain, however is that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its 
application of the presumption in conflict cases.
136  
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent line of pro-preemption decisions,
137 however, it 
may be fair to assume that the Court would not apply a presumption against preemption when 
                                                 
133 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 873 (“The Court has not previously driven a legal wedge — only a 
terminological one — between ‘conflicts’ that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a 
federal objective and ‘conflicts’ that make it ‘impossible’ for private parties to comply with both 
state and federal law.”); see also 1 TRIBE, supra note 122, §6-26, at 482. 
134 See Sharkey, supra note 27, at 458 (citing cases). 
135 See Drug and Device Law, The Presumption Against Preemption, 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2006/11/presumption-against-preemption.html (Nov. 15, 
2006) (With one arguable exception, the presumption against preemption hasn’t been employed 
— by the Supreme Court, anyway — to take the edge off actual conflicts between federal and 
state law. That’s not to say that the Court might not extend the presumption to every form of 
preemption, only that it has yet to do so, and that there are good reasons for not doing so.”). 
136 See Calvin Massey, “Joltin' Joe Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption 
Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759 (2003). 
137 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
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conducting conflict preemption analysis. One could argue that if Congress intended not to 
preempt, it would have done so in equally unequivocal language as it has done in other statutes, 
such as ERISA.
138 Congress does not seem to have adopted such unequivocal anti-preemption 
language for prescription drug regulations. It is true that the 1962 Drug Amendments do contain 
a qualified “savings clause,” which states: 
Section 202. Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal, Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any provision of State 
law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless there is a 
direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of State 
law.
139 
   
However, it is not clear that this provision applies to failure to warn claims. The clause is limited 
by its text to the amendments made by the 1962 legislation, which required the agency to 
consider the efficacy, as well as the safety, of a drug.
140 It is not applicable to the entire FDCA. 
The provisions delineating the drug approval process, however, including the NDA labeling 
requirements, predated the 1962 Amendments. Furthermore, even if the clause does apply to the 
regulation of prescription drug warnings, the text of the provision indicates that it contemplates 
preemption in circumstances involving “a direct and positive conflict.”
141 Therefore, it would not 
seem to displace ordinary conflict preemption principles. 
                                                 
138 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”). 
139 Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Pub L. No. 87-781 § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962). 
140 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 53, at 1032 (describing the legislative history behind the 
clause). 
141 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Dec. 21, 
2007), 2007 WL 455760 (citing Pub L. No. 87-781 § 202, 76 Stat. at 793). 
.   
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Some lower courts have nevertheless interpreted Section 202 to preclude object 
preemption claims, claiming that the provision allows preemption only in situations in which it 
would be impossible to comply with both federal and state law (actual preemption).
142 However, 
this interpretation is likely in incorrect for two reasons: First, as discussed above, the Court has 
recently equated actual preemption and conflict preemption in its analysis.
143 Second, even if 
Section 202 was treated as a savings clause proscribing conflict preemption, the Supreme Court 
has sometimes ignored express savings language and instead proceeded to consider language 
indicating whether state law should nonetheless be impliedly displaced. For example in Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co.,
144 the plaintiff brought a tort suit claiming that Honda’s automobile 
was defectively designed because it did not contain an airbag. The Federal Motor Vehicles Act 
contained a savings clause stating that “’compliance’ with a federal safety standard ‘does not 
exempt any person from any liability under common law.’”
145 The Court concluded, however, 
that the savings clause “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”
146 
Again, this exception would seem to apply to both actual preemption and obstacle preemption 
cases, since Geier was a case in which compliance with both the state and federal scheme was 
not impossible.  
   
                                                                                                                                                            
 
142 See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006). 
143 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
144 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
145 Id. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k)). 
146 Id. at 869.  
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b.  FDA’s Traditional Preemption Position 
 
Prior to 2002, FDA had not traditionally claimed that that the provisions of the FDCA 
preempted common law failure to warn actions.
147 Instead, FDA took the view that federal and 
state law operated independently, each providing a “significant, yet distinct layer of consumer 
protection.”
148 FDA conceptualized the FDCA labeling requirements as a “floor” for regulation, 
and states were free to supplement or augment these requirements to provide greater protection 
for consumers.
149 Under this approach, a manufacturer’s compliance with FDA regulations was 
admissible as evidence that product labeling is adequate, but it was not dispositive on the 
issue.
150  
                                                 
147 See James T. O’Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug Administration Approval 
of a Prescription Drug Label Extinguish State Claims for Inadequate Warning?, 58 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 287, 288 (2003) (“Until DHHS asserted prescription drug preemption in a brief to the 
Ninth Circuit in late 2002, FDA had remained aloof from preemption arguments that often had 
been made by prescription drug manufacturers in defense of individual products liability 
lawsuits.” (internal footnotes omitted)). FDA also articulated this position in an earlier product 
liability case against a prescription drug manufacturer, but that case was decided on other 
grounds. See Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc. No. 00 Civ. 4042 (LMM), 00 Civ. 4379 (LMM), 2000 WL 
1738645 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000). 
148 Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 7, 11 (1997) (writing as FDA Chief Counsel). 
149 See FDA, Final Rule, New Drug Requirements for Labeling Directed at the Patient, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 4214, 4214 (1978) (addressing labeling requirements for oral contraceptives and noting that 
liability for manufacturers was dependent on the applicable state law, and “[t]he fact that patient 
labeling may have been required and drafted by FDA would not protect the manufacturer from 
an  adverse jury determination on the issue of adequacy”); HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 53, at 
426 (stating that a line of products-liability cases brought by women who had used oral 
contraceptives “enunciated a general rule that FDA-mandated warnings represent the minimum, 
and not necessarily the appropriate, warnings for a prescription drug”).  
150 C.f. David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1003, 1015 (2004) (“[A] product seller's compliance with a statutory or regulatory safety 
standard in a negligence action is proper evidence of a product's nondefectiveness but is not 
conclusive of that issue.”).  
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Many of FDA’s arguments underlying this position mimic those set forth by today’s 
critics of preemption. For example, FDA warned that premarket approval of a product cannot 
anticipate or protect against all safety risks to consumers.
151 Furthermore, FDA cited the fact that 
preemption would foreclose all possibility of recovery by plaintiffs as a factor supporting a 
presumption against preemption.
152 Professor Mary Davis has summarized the reasoning 
underlying FDA’s historical position as follows:  
[G]overnmental regulations are based on narrowly defined goals, supported by 
limited information provided substantially by the regulated entity, and typically 
do not include setting optimal standards of care for all circumstances; rather, they 
set minimum standards not intended to prevent the operation of other remedial 
mechanism such as common law tort claims. Consequently, more exacting state 
tort law standards of care do not conflict, but operate concurrently with the federal 
requirements.
153 
 
An example of FDA’s previous view includes its position in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
154 a 
case examining the preemptive effect of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. The United 
States filed an amicus brief in that case, arguing in part that the labeling provisions of the Act 
and the implementing regulations did not preempt the failure-to-warn claims in that case.
155 
                                                 
151 Compare id., with Gilhooley, supra note 14, at 954 (“As has long been known, the risks drugs 
pose cannot be fully known from the testing done before approval.”). 
152 Compare id. at 9 (“Given the harsh implications of foreclosing all judicial recourse for 
consumers injured by defective medical devices, FDA does not believe that Congress meant to 
effect so sweeping a change without even a comment.”), with Sharkey, supra note 27, at 503-04 
(“In my view, although existence of a remedial void should not lead inevitably to an anti-
preemption position, it should take arguments for implied field preemption off the table.”). 
153 Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. 
L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (2007) (internal footnotes omitted). 
154 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
155 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27-28, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, Nos. 95-
754, 95-886 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1996), 1996 WL 118035.  
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Furthermore, shortly after that decision, the then-Chief Counsel of the FDA, Margaret Jane 
Porter, stated that the agency’s position in that case was consistent with its traditional 
presumption against preemption, particularly when state regulations provide greater consumer 
protection.
156 According to Porter, “FDA’s position has always been that state and local 
requirements are not preempted and may be enforced until FDA establishes specific counterpart 
requirements. . . .”
157  
In the context of product liability claims against drug manufacturers, FDA also 
traditionally adopted a presumption against preemption. For example, FDA included statements 
in a former drug labeling rule indicating that FDA favored labeling changes by manufacturers to 
increase information.
158 The 1979 rule addressing the form and content of prescription drug 
labeling, the Commissioner advised that “these labeling regulations do not prohibit a 
manufacturer, packer, relabeler, or distributor from warning health care professionals whenever 
possibly harmful adverse effects associated with the use of the drug are discovered.”
159 The 
Commissioner also specifically addressed manufacturer liability, stating: “In considering these 
regulations in a product liability case, at least one court has held that an NDA holder may have a 
duty to add a warning before FDA approval of a supplemental application.”
160 Under this 
                                                 
156 Porter, supra note 148, at 7. 
157 Id. 
158 See FDA, Final Rule, Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for 
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434 (1979). 
159 Id. at 37,447. 
160 Id. (citing McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (Ore. 1974)).  
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framework, a line of cases established “a general rule that FDA-mandated warnings represent the 
minimum, and not necessarily the appropriate, warnings for a prescription drug.”
161 
 
c.  FDA’s Current Preemption Position 
 
Beginning in 2002, FDA began to take the position that compliance with FDA-mandated 
labeling preempts common law failure-to-warn claims. Former Chairman of the FDA under the 
Bush Administration, Daniel Troy, took the view that the FDCA labeling requirements are 
“central to the FDA’s mission” and argued that “without full control of the content of drug 
labeling, the FDA could not effectively convey its risk-benefit information to prescribers.”
162 
Critical to this position is the assertion that the FDCA labeling regulations establish the optimal 
standards for regulation — in a sense, both a ceiling and a floor on the requirements for 
manufacturers.
163 Such reasoning is necessary to a pro-preemption argument because the 
contrary view interprets the CBE provisions in the FDCA to mean that “[t]he position of the 
FDA is that a manufacturer can, and should, provide stronger warnings as soon as such a 
                                                 
161 HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 55, at 436. 
162 Troy, supra note 50, at 85. Troy also argues that the new position is a much-needed response 
to the threat of state tort claims. However, this reasoning does not appear in FDA amicus briefs 
or rulemaking. See id. at 82 (“[T]he FDA’s increasingly explicit assertion that the [FDCA] and 
its accompanying regulations preempt state law cannot be viwed as a unilateral change of 
direction. Rather, it is best viewed as a response to protect the FDA’s mission and objectives, as 
defined by Congress, against independent threats emanating from state tort law, especially 
failure-to-warn suits.”). 
163 See Troy, supra note 50, at 84 (“When the FDA approves a new drug, it does not set a 
minimum safety standard: rather, it balances the risks associated with the drug against the 
competing risks associated with not having the drugs available and sets what it sees as an optimal 
standard. Manufacturers can fail to meet that optimal standard by including less or more than the 
FDA requires.”) (internal footnote omitted).  
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warning is warranted.”
164  Thus, the CBE requirements are used by plaintiffs to rebut the 
argument that FDA requires full control of the content of drug labeling.
165 For example, in 
Levine v. Wyeth,
166 the Vermont Supreme Court case granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, 
the CBE provisions were crucial to the court’s preemption analysis. The court reasoned: “While 
specific federal labeling requirements and state common-law duties might otherwise leave drug 
manufacturers with conflicting obligations, § 314.70(c) allows manufacturers to avoid state 
failure-to-warn claims without violating federal law.”
167 Therefore, in recent years, FDA has 
repeatedly asserted its view that the CBE provisions do not transform the federal labeling 
requirements into a minimum standard or allow drug manufacturers to unilaterally amend the 
labeling for a product without limitation. FDA has articulated this position, and explained the 
reasoning behind it, in a number of amicus briefs, in the preamble to a 2006 drug labeling rule, 
and in a recently proposed rule.  
                                                 
164 MICHAEL E. CLARK, PHARMACEUTICAL LAW: REGULATION OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND MARKETING  105 (2007); see also Levine v. Wyeth  944 A.2d 179, 187 (Vt. 2006) 
(determining 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) “appears to allow unilateral changes to drug labels whenever 
the manufacturer believes it will make the product safer, and places no limit on the duration of 
pre-approval warnings unless the FDA disapproves of the change”). 
165 See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 24, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Jan. 2, 
2008), 2008 WL 55106 (“[I]t would not have been impossible to comply with a state-law duty to 
warn [requirements] . . . and federal labeling requirements because those requirements expressly 
give manufacturers the right to revise labels to include contraindications, warnings, and 
instructions that enhance patient safety without prior FDA approval.”) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 
314.70(c)(6) and 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e)); see also Jonathan V. O’Steen & Van O’Steen, The FDA 
Defense: Vioxx® and the Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries 
Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 82 -83 (2006) (“The availability of [the 
CBE provisions] undercuts popular arguments made by drug manufacturers that labeling is 
within the exclusive control of the FDA.”).   
166 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006) 
167 Id. at 187.  
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FDA first asserted its new position in an amicus brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit in 
Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.
168 In Motus, the widow of a man who committed suicide while taking the 
antidepressant Zoloft brought a common law failure-to-warn claim against the drug manufacturer 
Pfizer, alleging that Pfizer failed to provide adequate warnings to doctors of the alleged suicide 
risk associated with Zoloft.
169 In considering, and approving, the Zoloft NDA, FDA had 
previously determined that there was no credible evidence “to support a conclusion that 
antidepressant drugs cause the emergence and/or intensification of suicidality and/or other 
violent behaviors.”
170 Therefore, FDA did not require that such warnings appear on the product 
label. The issue on appeal was whether Pfizer’s compliance with the labeling provisions of the 
FDCA and the applicable regulations preempted the plaintiff’s failure-to warn claim. According 
to FDA, compliance with state law would obstruct the purposes and objectives of the FDCA for 
two main reasons: First, imposing liability would thwart FDA’s objective of ensuring optimal 
use of a drug because disseminating an unnecessary warning would curtail the beneficial use of a 
drug.
171 Second, excess warnings required under state law could detract from the FDA-approved 
warnings. As FDA stated in its amicus brief in Motus: 
Under-utilization of a drug based on dissemination of scientifically 
unsubstantiated warnings, so as to deprive patients of beneficial, possibly life-
saving treatment, could well frustrate the purposes of federal regulation as much 
as over-utilization resulting from a failure to disclose a drug’s scientifically 
demonstrable adverse effects. Further, allowing unsubstantiated warnings may 
                                                 
168 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’g 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (C.D. Cal 2000).  
169 See id. at 660. 
170 Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-
Appellant at 9, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2002), 2002 
WL 32303084  [hereinafter Motus Brief]. 
171 Id. at 15.  
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also diminish the impact of valid warnings by creating an unnecessary distraction 
and making even valid warnings less credible.
172 
 
Since its amicus brief in Motus, FDA has repeated this pro-preemption position in a 
number of other amicus briefs before state and federal courts.
173 The most recent articulation is 
in a supplemental brief for certiorari in Wyeth v. Levine,
 174 which was recently granted certiorari 
by the Supreme Court.
175 In Levine, the plaintiff’s hand and forearm were amputated after the 
anti-nausea medication Phenergan was injected directly into her artery.
176 The plaintiff brought a 
common law failure-to-warn claim against the manufacturer, Wyeth, alleging that Wyeth’s 
failure to warn of the known dangers of direct intravenous injection of Phenergan caused her 
injuries.
177 Although the Phenargan label was FDA approved, the plaintiff argued that additional 
warnings could and should have been added under the CBE provisions of the FDCA. The 
Supreme Court of Vermont held that the claim was not preempted by federal law because it did 
“not impose conflicting obligations on defendant or present an obstacle to the objectives of 
Congress.”
178 FDA filed an amicus brief supporting certiorari on behalf of the defendants.
179 In 
                                                 
172 Id. at 23-24. Motus was eventually decided on grounds other than preemption. See Motus, 358 
F.3d at 661. 
173 See Davis, supra note 153, at 1095 n.34 (citing cases in which FDA submitted amicus briefs 
advocating the position that approved prescription drug labeling preempts state product liability 
claims). 
174 No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006). 
175 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Dec. 21, 
2007), 2007 WL 455760.  
176 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 194.  
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the brief, FDA argued that that the plaintiff’s claims “are impliedly preempted by the FDCA 
because they challenge labeling that FDA approved . . . based on its expert weighing of the risks 
and benefits requiring additional or different warnings.”
180 As in Motus, FDA emphasized that 
unnecessary warnings and exaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate uses of a beneficial 
drug or detract from more meaningful risk information.
181 The agency concluded that “[f]or these 
reasons, ‘FDA interprets the FDCA to establish both a “floor” and a “ceiling”’ with respect to 
drug labeling.”
182 
FDA also formalized its pro-preemption position in the preamble of a 2006 rule updating 
the format and labeling requirements for prescription drugs. The preamble supports the position 
previously articulated in amicus briefs that full control over drug labeling is essential for FDA to 
convey its risk-benefit mission.
183 The provision emphasizes that labeling is “[t]he centerpiece of 
risk management,” as it “communicates to health care practitioners the agency’s formal, 
authoritative conclusions regarding the conditions under which the product can be used safely 
and effectively.
184 The preamble furthermore states in relevant part: 
FDA believes that State laws conflict with and stand as an obstacle to 
achievement of the full objectives and purposes of Federal law when they purport 
to compel a firm to include in labeling or advertising a statement that FDA has 
                                                                                                                                                            
179 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2007), 2007 
WL 4555760. 
180 Id. at 7. 
181 Id. at 10-11 (“A warning in a drug’s labeling must strike a balance between notifying users of 
potential dangers and not unnecessarily deterring beneficial uses.”). 
182 Id. at 11 (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (2006)). 
183 See Troy, supra note 50, at 85. 
184 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934 (quoted in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Wyeth v. 
Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2007)).  
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considered and found scientifically unsubstantiated. . . . The agency believes that 
State law conflicts with and stands as an obstacle to achievement of the full 
objectives and purposes of Federal law if it purports to preclude a firm from 
including in labeling or advertising a statement that is included in prescription 
drug labeling. By complying with the State law in such a case and removing the 
statement from labeling, the firm would be omitting a statement required under § 
201.100(c)(1) as a condition on the exemption from the requirement of adequate 
directions for use, and the omission would misbrand the drug . . . .
185 
 
In sum, the text of the provision reiterates the position that FDCA sets both a ceiling and a floor 
on the labeling requirements for manufacturers.
186 It therefore serves as a powerful tool for 
opposing claims that manufacturers may provide warnings over and above those approved by 
FDA. Though the level of deference that courts should give to agency views expressed in a 
preamble of a rule is a subject of fierce debate among scholars,
187 in practice courts have given 
considerable weight to agency views expressed through more informal procedures.
188 
FDA recently added an even more powerful weapon to its pro-preemption arsenal, 
however. On January 16, 2008 FDA brought its preemption position into even sharper focus 
when it issued a proposed rule that would reaffirm “the agency’s longstanding view on when a 
change to the labeling of an approved drug, biologic, or medical device may be made in 
advance of the agency’s review and approval of such change.”189 Under the proposed rule, 
FDA would amend the CBE provisions to reaffirm that a changes may be made according 
                                                 
185 FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
186 See id. 
187 FDA, Proposed Rule, Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2848 (proposed Jan. 11, 2008). 
188 Id. 
189 Id.  
  41 
the CBE provisions only under narrow circumstances: to show newly acquired information or 
to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction . . . if there is 
sufficient evidence of a causal association with the drug, biologic, or device.”
190 For example, 
a CBE supplement may be appropriate if a postmarket study suggests a more severe and 
significant adverse reaction, but one would not be appropriate merely to provide additional data 
on a known adverse reaction.
191 
In explaining the reasoning behind this clarification, the proposed rule reiterates the 
policy arguments advanced by FDA in earlier amicus briefs. For example, the proposed rule 
explains that allowing sponsors to unilaterally amend labeling without limitation would 
undermine the FDA approval process.
192 It also reiterates the policy reasons for preemption that 
the agency articulated in numerous amicus briefs: permitting a manufacturer to unilaterally add 
warnings “would disrupt FDA’s careful balancing of how the risks and benefits of the product 
should be communicated.”
193  
The proposed rule could have significant consequences for preemption of state tort claims 
because it provides a more formalized expression of FDA’s view that the federal rules are 
supposed to be both a floor and a ceiling for labeling requirements. Commentators have already 
noted that “the proposed rule, if finalized, could give significant support to firms that invoke an 
FDA preemption defense in product liability cases where plaintiffs argue that firms should revise 
                                                 
190 Id. at 2849. 
191 FDA Law Blog, FDA Proposes to Codify Longstanding Policy for Making Labeling Changes 
for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices; Change Could Significantly Affect 
Preemption Defense (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/ 
2008/01/fda-proposes-to.html. 
192 Id.  
193 Id.  
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their own labeling in accordance with state law.”
194 The implications of this proposed rule for 
federal preemption of state tort claims will be discussed in more detail in Part IV. In the 
meantime, let it suffice to say that the proposed rule has invoked outrage among many 
commentators and members of Congress. On January 23, 2008, for example, several members of 
Congress sent a letter to FDA Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach expressing their 
opposition to the proposed rule. In particular, the Congresspersons accused the FDA of 
abandoning its mission and instead attempting to protect pharmaceutical companies from being 
held liable for marketing products that they know are unsafe. In some of the sharpest language, 
the letter argued that “[t]he issuance of the proposed CBE rule is not an isolated case, but part of 
a pattern of actions in the Bush Administration’s final months to permanently insulate the drug 
and device industry from liability.”
195 In response, FDA continued to stay true to its pro-
preemption message — Stephen Mason, FDA’s acting assistant commissioner for legislation 
insisted that the proposals modifying the CBE proposals has become a high public health 
priority.
196 
                                                 
194 FDA Law Blog, U.S. House and Senate Democrats Pen Letter to FDA Expressing “Profound 
Regret” Over FDA’s Proposed Labeling Rule (Jan. 28, 2008), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2008/01/us-house-and-se.html. 
195 Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al. to the Hon. Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D., 
Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080123120931.pdf. Numerous commentators have 
echoed the Congressmen’s accusation that FDA has been subject to industry capture. See, e.g. 
David Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 100 (2005) (“[B]y 
working hand-in-glove with industry to change the law on preemption, the Administration has 
given the public legitimate reason to question whether the FDA is serving the interests of the 
public or the industry it regulates.”). 
196 See Pete Mansell, CBE Labeling Rule Does Not Let Manufacturers off the Hook, FDA Insists, 
IN-PARMA TECHNOLOGIST.COM, Feb. 04, 2008, http://www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/news/ 
ng.asp?id=84385-fda-labelling-cbe (quoting Stephen Mason).  
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One of the interesting aspects of the proposed CBE rule is the fact that both FDA and 
opponents of the rule have invoked the FDAAA to support their position. In the proposed rule, 
FDA explicitly argues that its understanding of the CBE provisions is supported by its enhanced 
authority to control drug labeling under the FDAAA.
197 Several members of Congress, on the 
other hand, have argued that FDA’s proposed CBE rule contradicts Congress’s intent when 
passing the rule of construction. According to Congressmen Spulak and others, Congress 
included the rule of construction to strike a balance between giving FDA authority to protect 
consumers from adverse reactions and “preserving the ability of Americans to pursue common 
law remedies.”
198 The proposed rule, however, “directly contradicts this language by reversing a 
drug manufacturer's obligation to warn of new risks and hazards and, instead, allowing these 
companies to claim immunity from liability because they had no duty to warn.”
199 
 
IV.  THE EFFECT OF THE FDAAA ON FDA PREEMPTION CLAIMS 
 
In light of the opposing views on preemption and the lack of direct Supreme Court 
precedent on the issue, it is not surprising that lower court decisions concerning preemption of 
drug-related common law tort claims are split on whether FDA’s authority over new drug 
approvals impliedly preempts some state law tort claims.
200 In attempting to predict the holding 
                                                 
197 FDA, Final Rule, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (2006); see also infra Part IV 
(discussing the impact of the FDAAA on FDA preemption claims). 
198 Mansell, supra note 196 (quoting the Spulak letter). 
199 Id. 
200 For example, compare In re Bextra & Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices & Prod. Liability 
Litigation, No. M:05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal., Aug.16, 2006); Colacicco v.  
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of the Supreme Court in a case like Wyeth v. Levine, it is important to consider the reasoning 
behind these cases, but it is also necessary to consider how the recent passage of the FDAAA 
changes the preemption landscape. As is true with any preemption analysis, in order to determine 
the preemption impact of the FDAAA, it is necessary to ascertain the intent of Congress.
201 As 
the Supreme Court has noted, the “purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption 
analysis.”
202 Courts devine the intent of Congress primarily through three sources: the plain text 
of the statute, the legislative history, and agency interpretations of the statute. This Part therefore 
analyzes each of these sources in the context of the FDAAA. Section A concludes that the text of 
the statute, in particular the rule of construction, is subject to varying interpretations, and is not 
likely to be conclusive. Section B likewise determines that the legislative history of the Act 
contains only conflicting statements by individual Congresspersons, none of which is dispositive 
on the issue of congressional intent. Section C argues that courts should instead give deference to 
FDA’s interpretation of the Act as contained in amicus briefs, the preamble to the 2006 format 
and content rule, and in the proposed CBE rule. Lastly, Section D concludes that as a policy 
matter, the increased surveillance and enforcement mechanisms contained in the FDAAA 
mitigate many of the concerns advanced by scholars against preemption of state product liability 
claims. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Apotex, Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d 514 (E.D.Pa.2006); Needleman v. Pfizer Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-
3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697 (N.D. Tex., Aug.6, 2004); Dusek v. Pfizer Inc., No. Civ. A. H-02-
3559, 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D.Tex., Feb.20, 2004), with In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. 
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a.  The Text of the Rule of Construction 
 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the plain text of the statute is the 
authoritative source for statutory interpretation, and is the appropriate place to begin when 
conducting such an analysis.
203 The FDAAA text that most impacts the preemption analysis is 
the rule of construction.
204 On one hand, the text of the provision seems to indicate that it does 
little to alter the preemption debate. The rule states that “This paragraph shall not be construed to 
affect the responsibilities or the responsible person. . . ,” therefore it only applies only to the   
provisions of FDAAA § 901, which merely describe the new authority for FDA to order 
manufacturers to conduct post market studies and clinical trials.
205 Placed in the context of § 901, 
the rule of construction therefore emphasizes that the section does not displace existing FDA 
labeling rules, including the CBE rule.
206 The text of the FDAAA, therefore, would not support 
arguments for or against preemption — instead, the previous provisions delineating manufacturer 
responsibilities must inform the debate.
207 
                                                 
203 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (“We have found it unnecessary to 
rely upon that agency view because we think the statute itself speaks clearly to the point at 
issue.”). 
204 See FDCA § 505(o)(4)(I); see also supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (discussing 
the rule of construction). 
205 See supra notes 75-79 an accompanying text. 
206 Astrazeneca’s Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Briefing Regarding AstraZeneca’s 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the Basis of Federal Preemption, In re Seroquel 
Products Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1769 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2007). 
207 C.f. CONG. REC. S11839 (Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (arguing that nothing in 
the rule of construction changes “FDA’s ultimate authority over drug labeling; nor is it intended 
to change the legal landscape in this area”). 
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However, the rule of construction has thus far been subject to widely varying 
interpretations in briefs and in the literature. Some scholars and commentators have taken the 
position that the rule of construction is a “savings clause” meant to indicate that the FDAAA 
provisions were not intended to have a preemptive effect. For example, David Kessler and David 
Vladeck have argued that, by codifying the manufacturer’s obligation to maintain its label in 
accordance with the existing CBE requirements, the rule of construction “undercuts the key pro-
preemption argument the FDA and manufacturers make – namely, that the FDA alone decides 
the content of drug labels.”
208 This view seems contradicted however, by the fact that Congress 
chose to drop a provision in the House version of the bill that would have expressly barred 
preemption claims.
209  
In light of the considerable uncertainly surrounding the rule of construction, the 
interpretation of the rule that is probably most correct is the one that holds that the issue of 
preemption should be left to the courts to decide in light of other provisions.
210  In light of the 
likelihood that courts may look beyond the plain text of the statute to determine congressional 
intent, I next examine the legislative history of the statute. 
 
b.  The Legislative History of the FDAAA 
The legislative history is a natural starting place for ascertaining the congressional intent 
behind federal law, and litigants on both sides have already looked to the history of the FDAAA 
                                                 
208 David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to 
Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 468-69. 
209 See infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
210 ARNOLD & PORTER, supra note 48, at 8 (describing the rule of construct as an attempt “to 
leave it to the courts to address the preemptive effects of labeling actions.”).  
  47 
to gain insight into Congress’s intent and support their preemption arguments. For this reason, I 
spend some time reviewing the legislative history of the FDAAA with respect to the rule of 
construction and preemption of state tort law claims. However, I ultimately determine that the 
legislative history is inconclusive, and provides little compelling authority to support either side 
of the preemption debate. 
The original House and Senate versions differ markedly in their positions toward 
preemption. The Senate version took a generally pro-preemption position, adopting language that 
“would have also implied that if a company was already in discussions with the FDA about the 
labeling issue, and attempting to determine if the labeling change was necessary, then a future 
lawsuit would have to argue how the company was acting in an improper way.”
211 The House 
version, in contrast, initially contained savings-clause-like language asserting that the nothing in 
the new legislation would preempt state law products liability claims. The provision stated: 
“Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act may be construed as having any legal 
effect on any cause of action for damages under the law of any State (including statutes, 
regulations, and common law.”
212 The language tracked the anti-preemption language of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act (“OSHA”),
213 which has been interpreted by several lower 
                                                 
211 See also CONG. REC. S11836 (Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Allard) (arguing that “the 
FDA regulation would have ‘occupied the field’ with respect to liability for failure to warn”). 
212 People Over Profits, Information on the Rule of Construction Regarding Federal Preemption, 
http://www.peopleoverprofits.org/site/c.ntJWJ8MPIqE/b.2804449/k.BC2F/Federal_Preemption.
htm (reporting the text of the proposed savings cluase). 
213 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). The savings clause in OSHA states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed. . .to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory 
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, 
diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.” Id.  
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courts to restrict the preemptive effects of OSHA regulations in tort suits.
214 Former FDA chief 
counsel Daniel Troy said that under at least one interpretation, the provision “would completely 
undercut FDA’s authority.”
215 At a hearing of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s 
Health Subcommittee, panel Republicans and representatives of the FDA and drug and device 
manufacturers objected to the anti-preemption language,
216 and industry threatened to pull their 
support for the bill. A compromise was reached in the final version: the current rule of 
construction. 
Determining the congressional intent behind the rule of construction is no easy task, 
however. Unfortunately, the legislative history available in the case of the FDAAA is 
particularly non-authoritative. Committee reports are “the authoritative source for legislative 
intent,”
217 but the House Report says nothing about the rule of construction, and there is no 
Senate Report or Conference Report. Therefore, the primary information about Congress’s intent 
when passing the Bill comes from the statements of individual speakers in the Congressional 
Record. These statements are by no means dispositive, however. The Supreme Court has 
                                                 
214 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2007); Pedraza v. Shell Oil 
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recognized many times that “[f]loor debates reflect at best the understandings of individual 
Congressmen,”
218 and therefore are not controlling when analyzing the text of a statute.
219 
Numerous litigants and commentators have nevertheless argued that the legislative 
history of the FDAAA indicates that the Act was not intended to preempt state tort claims.
220 
Indeed, the legislative history does contain some statements to support this view. For example, 
Senator Gene Green stated: 
There is no question that the labeling and liability language prompted a great deal 
of debate during conference negotiations, but one thing is clear: the Congress in 
no way intends to limit the ability of a patient injured by a drug to seek redress 
from our Nation’s justice system. FDA should have the ability to require labeling 
changes, but that additional authority does not absolve the drug manufacturer of 
any duty to initiate labeling changes on their own when new data bears out the 
need for a change.
221 
 
This sentiment was echoed in the House by Representative Waxman, who observed that “this 
legislation will make clear that, in giving FDA this labeling change authority, Congress does not 
intend to impact, in any way, a drug company’s responsibility to promptly update its label with 
safety information on its own accord.”
 222  
However, some pro-preemption commentators have noted that many of the anti-
preemption statements by Congresspersons relate to field preemption—not conflict preemption, 
                                                 
218 Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969). 
219 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (“the remarks of a single 
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as is typically asserted in drug liability cases. Take, for example, Senator Kennedy’s statement 
made when introducing the Senate version of the bill:  
By enacting this legislation, we do not intend to alter existing state law duties 
imposed on a drug manufacturer to obtain and disclose information regarding 
drug safety hazards either before or after a drug receives FDA approval or 
labeling. We do not believe that the regulatory scheme embodied in this act is 
comprehensive enough the preempt the field or every aspect of state law. FDA’s 
approval label has always been understood to be the minimum requirement 
necessary for approval. In providing the FDA with new tools and enhanced 
authority to determine drug safety, we do not intend to convert this minimum 
requirement into a maximum.
223 
 
Furthermore, some comments in the legislative history indicate that the Act was not 
intended to alter the current preemption standard. Take, for example, Senator Alexander’s 
statement: 
[T]his legislation reinforces FDA’s broad authority over prescription drug labels. 
Under current law, States are preempted from substituting their judgment for the 
FDA’s scientific decisions based on exhaustive reviews of clinical data. If this 
weren’t the case, medicine labels would become so overwhelmed with warnings 
designed to avert lawsuits that most Americans will simply stop paying attention 
to them. 
  Additionally, Congress has decided to give FDA the authority to make 
expedited labeling changes, so that when prescription drug safety problems are 
identified the FDA and drug manufacturers can work together to quickly update 
product  labels  to  ensure  that  the  American  people  have  the  latest  safety 
information. If a drug manufacturer comes to the FDA in good faith to discuss the 
possible need for an expedited labeling change—and if the FDA does not respond 
in  a  timely  manner  or  decides  that  the  science  does  not  require  a  labeling 
change—then  that  drug  manufacturer  should  not  be  subject  to  frivolous 
lawsuits.
224 
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Likewise, Senator Coburn argued that the Act stood to preempt state tort law claims.
225 In 
contrast Senator Kennedy’s contention that the FDCA established a floor for prescription 
drug labeling requirements, Senator Coburn stated: “I want to be clear that the FDA’s 
labeling requirements establish both a ‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling.’”
226  
Thus,  culling  a  clear  congressional  intent  from  the  legislative  history  is  quite 
difficult. This not necessarily surprising, considering that Congress is often intentionally 
vague in passing laws, in order to obtain the necessary votes needed for the statute’s 
passage.
227  Indeed,  although  several  Senators  and  Congresspersons  indicated  that 
Congress “clearly’ objected to preemption in the legislation,
228 ostensibly through the 
rule of construction, others recognized that the language of the provision is anything but 
clear. For example, Senator Enzi warned: “I am deeply concerned about the provisions 
related  to  labeling  changes  and  liability,  given  that  we  do  not  fully  understand  the 
implications of that language. This new rule of construction was part of the House-passed 
                                                 
225 CONG. REC. S11839 (Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (“It is clear that Congress 
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  52 
language as not something the Senate fully debated.”
229 Thus, the legislative history of 
the FDAAA is unlikely to provide any definitive guidance to courts in conducting their 
preemption analysis. 
 
c.  Deference to FDA’s Interpretation of the FDAAA 
 
In contrast to the text of the statute or the legislative history, FDA’s interpretation of the 
pro-preemption impact of the FDAAA is likely to be relevant to courts’ analysis. In fact, the 
agency’s position may one of the more reliable predictors of how the Supreme Court is likely to 
rule on a preemption case. Professor Catherine Sharkey has argued that a trend towards agency 
deference has emerged in the Supreme Court’s recent products liability cases.
230 She notes that 
“from Cipollone in 1992 to Riegel in 2008, the Supreme Court's position in every products 
liability preemption case (save one — Bates) aligned with the relevant underlying federal 
agency's take on preemption.”
231 A number of Supreme Court opinions have also emphasized 
that an agency’s intent to preempt state regulation will usually be decisive.
232 
An agency’s intent to preempt state regulation may take a variety of forms, however, 
from articulation in formal notice-and-comment rulemaking to less formal interpretive 
statements and rule preambles. FDA has generally adopted an informal tactic of expressing its 
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preemption views in amicus briefs before courts deciding preemption questions. It also expressed 
its position in the preamble to the 2006 rule revising the format and content requirements for 
prescription drug labels.
233 The use of these informal statements raises an interesting question of 
what level of deference that should be given to such statements. In the seminal case of Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
234 the Supreme Court held that courts 
must grant deference to agency interpretations of statutes they administer if: (1) Congress has not 
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and (2) the agency’s interpretation “is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.”
235 However, in the subsequent case of United States v. 
Mead Corporation,
236 the Court clarified that such mandatory deference is only required when 
there is an “indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law.”
237 
However, where an agency interpretation is not accorded Chevron deference, it may still be 
granted deference under the standard announced in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
238 The Skidmore 
standard is rather amorphous — though the agency interpretation is not controlling upon the 
courts under this standard, that courts has stated that such interpretations nevertheless “constitute 
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance.”
239 The court may accord the agency’s judgment the amount of deference it deems 
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appropriate based on the thoroughness of the agency’s consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with other pronouncements, and “all those factors which give it power 
to persuade.”
240  
Though some lower courts have accorded Chevron deference to FDA’s preemption views 
as articulated in amicus briefs and the preamble to the 2006 format and content rule,
241 dicta in 
the recent case of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. indicates that the Supreme Court would be unlikely 
to adopt this view. The court indicated that had the relevant statute been ambiguous in that case, 
“Skidmore deference would seemingly be at issue” when considering the statements in FDA’s 
amicus brief.
242 The Court also implied that under Skidmore, “the degree of deference might be 
reduced by the fact that the agency’s earlier position was different.”
243 However, the Court seems 
to recede from this position, stating: “But of course the agency’s earlier position . . . is even more 
compromised, indeed deprived of all claim to deference, by the fact that it is no longer the 
agency’s position.”
244 Thus, it is somewhat difficult to predict what deference, if any, the Court 
would accord FDA’s position in its amicus brief in Wyeth v. Levine. The opinion in Medtronic 
seems to imply that this position would receive some deference, though the degree would be 
reduced because of the FDA’s changed preemption position. 
Fortunately, this particular issue may become less relevant when analyzing the agency’s 
interpretation of the rule of construction, because the agency has set forth its interpretation of 
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that provision in a proposed rule. If the rule is finalized, it will constitute a formalized expression 
of FDA’s pro-preemption position, deserving of Chevron deference. Under Chevron deference, 
courts will defer to the agency’s view if it is “reasonable.”
245 Especially in light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Medtronic, it is unlikely that a court would determine that FDA’s pro-
preemption position is unreasonable. Thus, the FDAAA, combined with the 2008 proposed rule, 
constitutes a powerful tool supporting the agency’s preemption agenda. 
 
d.  The Impact of Other FDAAA Enforcement Provisions 
 
As a policy matter, deferring to the agency’s position may also be a wise decision. 
Professor Catherine Sharkey has argued that “with respect to answering the key regulatory policy 
issue at the heart of the preemption query — namely, whether there in fact should be a uniform 
federal regulatory policy — federal agencies emerge as the institutional actor best equipped to 
provide the answer.”
246 In the context of prescription drug labeling and warnings, FDA has 
repeatedly argued that the agency possesses the necessary expertise to determine the optimal 
regulatory strategy. Previous cases indicate that the Court would be receptive to recognizing the 
agency’s relevant expertise: In Geier, for example, the found it appropriate to defer to agency 
views in light of the fact that “the subject matter is technical; and the relevant history and 
background are complex and extensive. The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of 
its own regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact 
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of state requirements.”
247 Similarly, Justice Breyer, who wrote the Geier opinion, expressed this 
view in a concurring opinion in an earlier case, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
248 when he 
argued that “the federal agency charged with administering the statute is often better able than 
are courts to determine the extent to which state liability rules mirror or distort federal 
requirements.”
249 This line of cases indicates that the Court may be positioned to accord 
deference to FDA’s views on preemption in upcoming cases. 
Furthermore, the additional enforcement provisions in the FDAAA may also help rebut 
several of the key objections leveled against this sort of argument. Former FDA Commissioner 
Dr. David Kessler and Professor David Vladeck, for example, argue that FDA’s pro-preemption 
arguments are based on “an unrealistic assessment of the agency’s practical ability – once it has 
approved the marketing of a drug – to detect unforeseen adverse effects of the drug and to take 
prompt and effective remedial action.”
250 The expansive surveillance and enforcement provisions 
of the FDAAA discussed in detail in Part III, however, provide FDA with new ability to detect 
drug risks and adverse effects. Thus, on the eve of Wyeth v. Levine, FDA is on stronger ground 
then ever in asserting its preemption claims. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the billions of dollars potentially at stake for litigants in drug-related 
products liability claims, it is not surprised that the preemption debate has captured the 
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legal community. Nevertheless, despite the fierce debate, little consensus has emerged 
among either commentators or the courts on whether the labeling provisions of the FDCA 
preempt  common  law  products  liability  claims.  The  recent  and  extremely  significant 
legislation  embodied  in  the  FDAAA  adds  only  additional  uncertainty  to  the  legal 
landscape for preemption.  
The upcoming Supreme Court case of Wyeth v. Levine makes it imperative that 
scholars and commentators continue to dissect the numerous provisions of the FDAAA to 
try  and  assess  the  impact  of  this  extremely  complex  bill  on  drug-related  preemption 
claims. What is the significance of the FDA’s expanded enforcement and surveillance 
powers, post-market risk identification system, or clinical trials database, for example? 
This Paper represents an initial attempt to answer this question and analyze the complex 
text and history of the FDAAA in the preemption context. In light of the unclear “rule of 
construction” in the Act, and the equally obscure legislative history, this Paper concludes 
that by strengthening FDA’s powers, the FDAAA may also have strengthened FDA’s 
claim  for  preemption.  By  increasing  the  FDA’s  ability  to  effectively  regulate  drug 
efficacy  and  safety,  the  FDAAA  put  the  agency  on  stronger  ground  when  claiming 
ultimate authority over drug labeling. 